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Introduction
Like Chile, which was governed by a left of center
coalition for twenty years after the fall of Pinochet,
Brazil, for the last sixteen years, has been ran by left
of center parties under Fernando Henrique
Cardoso and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. The
assumption of Dilma Rousseff guarantees the con-
tinuity of the left of center parties for another four
years. Yet, contrary to the Chilean experience, in
which Christian Democrats and Socialists, the main
political parties in opposition to the dictatorship,
formed a coalition, in Brazil the two main parties,
the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB)
and the Worker’s Party (PT) have been political
rivals.
The political differences between the two main politi-
cal parties in Brazil, which trace their origins to left of
center groups in São Paulo that resisted the long
Brazilian dictatorship (1964–85), do not translate in
significant dissimilarities in terms of macroeconomic
policy. The pillars of the macroeconomic policy have
been the use of the exchange rate
as an anti-inflation instrument,
which has not changed with the
implementation of inflation tar-
geting since 1999, and the main-
tenance of primary surpluses,
even though in the second half of
Lula’s government, and particu-
larly after the 2008–9 global cri-
sis, counter cyclical fiscal policy
was pursued. Perhaps the most
distinctive characteristic of
Worker’s Party administrations,
in comparison with the preceding
one, is the expansion of the social
programs and the minimum wage, and the consequent
improvement in income distribution.
The remainder of the paper is divided in three parts.
The first looks at the economic performance since the
first of Lula’s terms, with an emphasis on the main
characteristics of the macroeconomic policy frame-
work. The following section discusses the social pro-
grams and the evolution of income distribution. The
last section analyzes what can be expected from the
Worker’s Party third term in command of the
Brazilian administration.
Locomotive or brake-van?
Ever since an economist at Goldman Sachs suggested
that Brazil, together with Russia, India and China,
was part of a special group of economies, the BRICs,
that would take over world GDP before mid-century,
the Brazilian economic performance has been lionized
in the international media. The perception, however,
of Brazil as one of the locomotives of global eco-
nomic growth in the twenty-first century is peculiar,
to say the least.
During the long period associated with the state-led
development strategy, roughly from the late 1940s to
around 1980, Brazil grew at an average of 7.5 percent
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* University of Utah.decade, which implied rates of
growth, on average, of 1.5 per-
cent, which was considerably bet-
ter than for the rest of Latin
America during this period. The
stabilization period, associated to
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s
tenures as Finance Minister and
President, spanning from 1993 to
2002, was associated with a small
recovery in the rates of economic
growth to 2.8 percent. It should
be noted that starting in the late
1980s, a significant process of
liberalization in the context of
the Washington Consensus doc-
trines has been implemented in
Brazil.
In that sense, many economic analysts believed that
Lula’s election foreshadowed a reversal in develop-
ment strategy, one that would reverse several of the
liberalization policies of the previous decade. As it
turned out the break with previous policies was con-
siderably less marked than expected, and in many
respects Lula’s administration represented a contin-
uation of the liberalizing policies of the 1990s. The
economic performance as measured by the real
GDP growth, showed improvement, with a rate of
growth of 4.1 percent per year on average, but this
was a global phenomenon. Additionally, Brazil grew
only slightly above the world average of around
3.4 percent, and considerably below the start per-
formers in Asia and Latin America. In other words,
the Brazilian economy was not leading the world
economy in terms of growth, and was far from the
perceived view as one of the world’s most dynamic
economies.
The reasons for the relatively poor performance in
terms of growth, when compared to more dynamic
economies in the developing world, are obviously
complex and have many causes. But it is fairly rea-
sonable to suggest that macroeconomic policies are
central to any explanation of the growth perfor-
mance. It should be noted that Brazil has had, since
stabilization in 1994, one of the highest, if not the
highest, real rate of interest in the world. Further,
the high rates of interest combined with a relative-
ly unregulated capital account, has led to signifi-
cant capital inflows and a long term tendency to
foreign exchange appreciation, punctuated by
external crisis.
In fact, exchange rate appreciation has been the
main instrument to control domestic prices, since
stabilization and still after the implementation of the
inflation-targeting framework (Vernengo 2008).
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the real exchange
rate (RER)1 over time, and the peculiar Latin
American tendency to appreciation, punctuated by
severe depreciations in time of crisis is clearly visible
(Frenkel and Rapetti 2010). In the Brazilian case, the
significant real exchange rate depreciations were in
the midst of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, with
the collapse of the Collor Stabilization Plan in the
early 1990s, and in 1999, after the Asian and Russian
financial crises.
The tendency to exchange rate appreciation is par-
ticularly problematic for countries with a balance of
payments constraint, as it is the case with develop-
ing countries, including Brazil. In particular, coun-
tries that have an external constraint cannot main-
tain a trade deficit, or a negative balance in the cur-
rent account, for prolonged periods, without signif-
icant capital inflows. The implication is that the risk
of external crises is higher, and that policies that
reduce the possibility of external default should be
favored.
The most reliable source of foreign funds is the one
that comes from export revenues. While export
dynamism depends on several factors, it is clear that
an appreciated exchange rate reduces external com-
petitiveness. In the state-led development period
exports grew at an average yearly rate of 10.3 percent,
which fell to around 5 percent during the two follow-
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1 Measured as the domestic price of foreign currency, which means
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ing decades. However, after 2002 the rate of growth of
exports picked up, and achieved an unprecedented
17.7 percent. It is clear that the growth of the global
economy, in particular the fast growth of the Chinese
and Indian economies, created space for higher rates
of growth around the globe.
However, the effect of an appreciated exchange rate
on the demand for imports compensated export
dynamism in the last period. As can be seen in
Figure 3, the real exchange rate appreciation of the
early 1990s implied significantly large trade (TB)
and current account (CA) deficits as a share of
total exports. The 1999 crisis, and the depreciation
of the real, allowed for surpluses during the
21st century, but the tendency to appreciation
reduced the trade surpluses and led to current
account deficits by 2008.
This is not to suggest that the Brazilian economy is
approaching an external crisis, as
it did in 1999, since the current
account deficits are still relatively
small, and Brazil has a large
amount of foreign reserves –
approximately 240 billion US
dollars at the end of 2009. How-
ever, it shows that the Brazilian
economy cannot grow at Chinese
levels without incurring into sig-
nificant trade and current
account deficits, and that, as a
result, the pace of growth must
be more moderate.
The recent appointment of
Alexandre Tombini, a fairly con-
servative economist, to head the
central bank, and the continuity of
the tightening of monetary policy,
which started in April 2010, shows
that the exchange rate will contin-
ue to be used as the main instru-
ment of inflationary control by the
new administration. The implica-
tion is that the policy mix of high
real rates of interest, and appreci-
ated exchange rates will remain in
place, and the Brazilian rates of
economic growth will remain well
below the ones of the more
dynamic developing countries.2
A new middle class?
If the participation in the BRICs, as one of the most
dynamic economies of the world, was the hallmark of
the international perception of Brazil in the 21st cen-
tury, then the improvement in income distribution
and the appearance of a new middle class has been
central to the domestic perception about the domi-
nant changes in the new century (e.g. Neri 2008). The
excitement about the so-called new middle class is
associated to what has been publicized as a significant
improvement in income distribution, often connected
to the increase in social spending.
It is true that the evolution of the Gini coefficient
shows an improvement starting in the late 1990s, a few
years after stabilization, and before the election of
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2 For a critique of this macroeconomic pol-
icy mix, see Bresser-Pereira (2007).around 0.6, one of the highest levels of inequality in
the world which would be compatible with a poor
country, to close to 0.54, still an incredibly high level
of inequality, but closer to what a middle income
country like Brazil might have.
As important as the improvement in income distrib-
ution for the discussion of the rise of the new middle
class has been the reduction in poverty rates, which
fell from close to 35 percent of the population in the
mid-1990s to approximately 20 percent at the end of
Lula’s second term. As with income distribution, it is
clear that from the late 1990s onwards there is a sig-
nificant improvement, as can be seen in Figure 5,
and the same occurred with extreme poverty that fell
from around 15 to slightly above 7 percent in the
same period.
As I noted in a previous work,3 however, Gini coeffi-
cients are not necessarily a good
measure of income inequality in
many developing countries, and
other social indicators, besides
poverty, had improved since the
1940s (i.e. before the current set
of social policies implemented by
left-of-center administrations),
which implied that a certain skep-
ticism was guaranteed when dis-
cussing the recent trends in social
indicators.
The average real remuneration of
workers in the metropolitan
region of São Paulo, the most
advanced industrial center in the
country, has not improved, and,
in fact, has decreased significant-
ly since the mid-1990s, remaining
constant at lower levels during
the two terms of Worker’s Party
administration (see Figure 6).
The apparent contradiction of an improvement in
income distribution and a stagnant real wage is rec-
onciled by the fact that the wages of the lower income
strata, in particular, the minimum wage have
increased at a faster pace.4 Further, the participation
of wages in total income remains below its level from
the early 1990s, despite some improvement in Lula’s
last presidential term (see Figure 7).5
It is true that the improvement in the functional dis-
tribution of income in the second term of the
Worker’s Party administration implied that by the
end (available data up to 2008) of the whole admin-
istration wages were higher than at the start in 2003.
Yet, they remain lower than when Fernando
Henrique Cardoso assumed the government in
1995, and still lower than in 1990, when it was
around 37 percent (46 in the extended measure) of
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3 See Camara and Vernengo (2006) for an
analysis of social policies during Lula’s
first term in office.
4 Serrano (2010) correctly points out that,
while the rate of interest and the exchange
rate have been the instruments of inflation-
targeting, the stagnation of real wages is
the anchor of price stability.
5 If one includes other remuneration of
labor, besides wages, total remuneration is
higher, at around 41 percent of national
income in 2007 (IPEA, 2008) and 42.7 per-
cent in 2008, but follows the same trajecto-
ry of wages, which were just below 34 per-
cent in 2008, virtually the same level that
operational surplus. The latter, it should be
noted is also higher once other remunera-
tion of capital is included.CESifo Forum 1/2011 21
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national income. It is hardly the sort of earth-shat-
tering event that is associated with the rise of a new
middle-class.6
The unwarranted notion of a new middle-class is tied
to the enlargement of social programs, and the expan-
sion of credit, which has allowed the increase of con-
sumption, and a change in some patterns of con-
sumption with an increase in the proportion of con-
sumer durables, in particular home appliances and
consumer electronics, for the lower classes.
Further, it is far from clear that social spending,
besides the expansion of the Bolsa Família has been
a priority of the Worker’s Party’s administrations.7
Table 1 shows that with the exception of the last
year, in every year government spending with the
service of public debt were higher than social
spending on health and education combined, when
both are measured as a share of total government
spending.
Additionally, it is clear that inter-
est payments have significantly
increased in the 1990s, and have
remained at relatively high levels
throughout the Cardoso and
Lula’s administrations. The fi-
nancialization of government
spending, that is a direct result of
high interest rates, reduces the
policy space for social programs,
particularly because primary tar-
gets for fiscal spending imply the
scope for discretionary spending
is small.
Further, since it is very unlikely,
as we noted in the previous sec-
tion, that monetary policy will change anytime soon,
and it is very likely that price stability will remain cen-
tral for monetary policy decisions, it is not clear that
average real wages will suddenly start growing, or that
functional income distribution will lead to a signifi-
cant increase in labor’s share.
What to expect?
The two previous sections try to demystify the
Brazilian recent experience. As it can be seen,
Brazilian economic performance has not been excep-
tional in the last decade. Also, and more importantly,
the improvements in income distribution have been
marginal, and do not guarantee the enthusiasm about
a new middle-class that has swept the media coverage
and the national conversation in Brazil.
It goes without saying that sheer size, and the owner-
ship of strategic resources, from the Amazon forest to
the recent discoveries of oil in the Atlantic coast,
imply that Brazil is an important player in world pol-
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1985 1.24  4.70 
1990 4.14  4.70 
2000 6.30  6.09 
2004 8.19  6.45 
2008 9.22  7.39 
2010 8.61  8.82 
a) Spending on Health, Education and Labor 
combined. 
Source: STN.
6 In colonial times, and up to the so-called Old Republic (1889-1930),
the middle class was a small group of independent workers and lib-
eral professionals, in an economy largely dominated by agricultural
production for exports. It was the process of industrialization that
expanded the range of the middle class, including the expansion of
state bureaucracy, and the development of higher education institu-
tions. Perhaps, the last significant enlargement of the middle class
occurred, paradoxically, in the late 1960s, when the income concen-
tration that resulted from the military regime economic policies,
allowed for an incorporation of new groups into the economy, and
an expansion of the patterns of consumption. Further, the new
social classes organized in new institutions leading to the new union-
ism of the 1970s, from which the Worker’s Party eventually emerged.
7 Spending on Bolsa Família tripled from 2003 to 2010, but remains
below 1 percent of total government spending in 2010. Coverage
increased from 3.5 to 12.5 million families approximately, which
implies that around 50 million people are covered. Bolsa Família is
the largest social transfer program in Latin America.it is also true that the so-called two-speed recovery, i.e.
slow in advanced countries, and much faster in emerg-
ing and developing economies, suggests that Brazil
will continue to grow faster than it did in the 1980s
and 90s, but most likely considerably below the levels
of the state-led development era.
The increase in the prices of commodities, in fact,
favors the Brazilian expansion, since Brazil is not an
importer of food, and is an exporter of commodities.
The growth in exports, reduces the risks of external
crises, and allows for more vigorous expansion of the
domestic market. The expansion of credit, the strate-
gic use of the National Development Bank (BNDES
in Portuguese), and the continuity of the Plan for the
Acceleration of Growth (PAC in Portuguese) bode
well for the domestic demand expansion. The planned
cut of 50 billion Brazilian reals, on the other hand,
seems an early concession to conservative groups pre-
occupied with inflation.
Whether Dilma will expand the more progressive
programs of Lula’s second term, and allow the econ-
omy to grow at a faster pace, promoting a more sig-
nificant redistribution of income, something that is
sorely needed in a country that remains among the
most unequal in the world, is far from certain. Early
signs point out to a more moderate agenda, more
akin to Lula’s first term. Perhaps we may suggest,
paraphrasing Marx, that the tradition of the dead
administration ‘weighs like a nightmare on the
brains of the living’.
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